Armenia and Azerbaijan: Peace and Beyond
By Tim Potier
The second Karabakh war concluded with a Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement in November 2020. However, three-and-a-half years on, the anticipated peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains just that–anticipated. It would probably be fair to say that, during the past two years, western countries (principally the United States and the European Union) have been dominant in the diplomatic efforts to secure lasting peace between Yerevan and Baku (with Kazakhstan now willing to play a supporting role). It would appear that any hope for independence for the Karabakh Armenians is forever lost. Yerevan has, for some time now, been at pains to recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, while also demanding that Baku reciprocate. The end of 2022 through 2023 brought excitement, with the seemingly-imminent signing of a peace treaty. Such hopes, though, appeared to be premature. Both sides endeavor to reassure an international audience that considerable progress has been made and that few items remain outstanding. However, it is always the final items which are the hardest to secure agreement around. Therefore, it is imperative that undue time is not allowed to pass without making further progress to resolve matters; otherwise, Armenia and Azerbaijan run the risk of falling away from the world’s attention and shelving the prospect of peace (effectively leaving resolution for a future generation). Events of recent weeks appear to indicate that Yerevan and Baku are keen to ensure that momentum is not lost and that the peace treaty is signed sooner rather than later.
A much-altered environment.
Those following the Karabakh conflict for many years have seen quite a transformation. Fifteen or so years ago, it seemed likely that Karabakh would trade land for a referendum on independence. Since the end of the first Karabakh war in 1994, few doubted that the Karabakh Armenians would secure, at a minimum, a high degree of autonomy – what might have been described as self-government or, alternatively, independence in all but name. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev was never interested in either possibility, however. His statements before becoming president (whilst his father, Heydar Aliyev, was still Azerbaijani president), ought to have served as a warning. For example, during a March 3, 2001 interview with the Interfax news agency – and while he was first vice-president of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) – Ilham Aliyev said that when it comes to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, “Azerbaijan must be prepared for resolving the problem by military means.” In the same interview, he claimed that certain Western circles were exerting pressure on Baku so as “to thrust a humiliating peace on Azerbaijan.” According to Aliyev, “In doing so, those certain Western circles are trying to destabilize the situation in Azerbaijan and bring to power weak and insignificant forces obedient to the West.” Unfortunately, governments, diplomats, and specialists, as they so often do, managed to create and then perpetuate their own narratives. With Baku exasperated by the interminable failure of the OSCE Minsk Group and the lack of progress toward resolution of the conflict, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in 2020. Then, in September 2023, an Azerbaijani military offensive displaced almost the entire Karabakh Armenian population from their homes. The difficulty now for Yerevan and the Karabakh Armenians is that, with Baku having achieved almost everything that they hoped to accomplish, there is less incentive for the latter to make compromises.
So, what happens next?
Delimitation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border may take years to conclude and is a separate matter from the peace treaty negotiations. A border commission has been established, but its work is still in its early stages. Nevertheless, a range of encouraging and necessary steps around both peace treaty negotiations and border delimitation have been taken recently. First, the Kremlin’s unexpected announcement and subsequent withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh (including the closure of the joint Russian-Turkish monitoring center). Notably, the 2020 ceasefire agreement included possible extension of the peacekeepers’ term beyond the initial mandate of five years, which would be November 2025. Second, there is agreement that the process of border delimitation will be based on the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991 which, inter alia, recognizes the territorial integrity and respects the inviolability of existing borders of all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (something both countries have been anxious to see upheld). Third, Armenia’s withdrawal from four occupied Azerbaijani villages and, for the first time since 1991 (and, therefore, for the first time since independence for both countries), demarcation of a part of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both sides would probably admit, albeit in private, that the position of a remaining handful of enclave villages, which existed during Soviet times, will be determined during the process of delimiting the border.
The major item still under discussion in peace treaty negotiations is transport connections (persons, vehicles, and cargo) linking the western regions of Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. The ceasefire agreement provided that the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB, in Russian) would be responsible for overseeing these connections. Yerevan, mindful of breaches of the agreement by its other parties, is unwilling to accept such oversight, regarding this as a violation of state sovereignty. Technology will assist in solving this problem. A distinction should be made between interrupted transit, for which enhanced checks will be required, and uninterrupted transit, for which any checks can be kept to a minimum. In recent weeks, provisions in Armenia’s law have been highlighted by Baku; in particular, the preamble of Armenia’s Constitution references the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which cites a 1989 unification act adopted by the legislative bodies of Soviet Armenia and what was then the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Yerevan asserts that the draft peace treaty already includes a clause that prevents parties from invoking legislation in order to avoid the obligations assumed under the treaty. Nevertheless, in recent days, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan ordered the Council on Constitutional Reforms, which he set up in 2022, to start drafting a new Armenian constitution.
Provisions in Armenia’s law do not have to provide a basis for a delay in the signing of the peace treaty, although it could. To be fair to both sides, an uncomfortable situation might arise if a peace treaty were signed and the law of either party retained provisions which might be interpreted as laying claim to the territory of the other. Therefore, in the worst-case scenario, one way to avoid undue delay could be for the treaty to be applied provisionally, pending the realization of any remaining outstanding matters, such as amendment of the Armenian Constitution.
Should a peace treaty be signed, it is likely that most if not all existing cases before international courts and tribunals will be withdrawn. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has already adverted to the possibility of this. True, it may not be feasible to withdraw every case, but it will serve neither party to leave certain matters to fester following the signing of a peace treaty, which can provide for mechanisms to handle issues like the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The alternative might otherwise encourage new and additional claims being lodged, particularly by Azerbaijan and formerly displaced Azerbaijani nationals. These could be, for example, for damage to publicly / privately owned property and loss of use.
The Russia factor.
The South Caucasus, including Georgia, should not be rendered the latest arena for competition between the West and Russia. All three South Caucasian states will wish to enhance their relations with the West and its organizations, institutions, and bodies. However, as close neighbors, it is inevitable that all three countries will wish to maintain and develop good relations with Turkey, Iran, and Russia. In this sense, the South Caucasus provides an opportunity for the West and Russia to shape that future. For instance, eventually, Armenia may wish to join the European Union. This may entail the country leaving the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia may wish for all or some Russian troops to be withdrawn from the country and to withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization. At some point, Azerbaijan may consider membership in NATO, but this is something for the future. The challenge for the West will then be to ensure that such an act does not compromise Russia’s security (an important factor with the accession of non-Baltic former Soviet republics into NATO) or negate Moscow’s legitimate expectations in terms of, for example, its diplomatic relations with the countries of the South Caucasus and trade with them. Such an inclusive and multilateral approach, in a region such as the South Caucasus, will contribute to an improvement in West-Russia relations and, in the short-to-medium term, assist the process of finding eventual compromises and accommodations for countries such as Ukraine. All of this will be greatly facilitated by securing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Tim Potier is a Senior Fellow at the Fletcher School’s Center for International Law and Governance. He is currently preparing a second revised edition (with Brill) of his earlier book (originally published by Kluwer Law International, in 2000), “Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: A Legal Appraisal”.
DSC_0428rev.flag.of.Nagorno.Karabakh] is by Michael Wong and is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.
