In a ‘Hard Power World’ Don’t Forget Soft Power: The Future of American Attraction
By Hendrik W. Ohnesorge and Michael F. Oppenheimer
Do we enter a world of hard power, where bullets and bombs are the sole hallmarks of a great power? Does only force of arms or fear of sanctions get you what you want in global politics? Or is there still a place for soft power today?
Soft power—as coined by our colleague Joseph S. Nye, Jr. from Harvard University more than three decades ago—means the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion or payments. It feeds on such tools as cultural diplomacy, the exchange of ideas and people, the stories we tell each other about the world, and the decisions we make that impact on the welfare of others.
Lately, we are frequently told by practitioners, analysts, and commentators that the world is now dominated by hard power. The liberal rule-based order, built by American hegemony, is passing into history, replaced by diffusion and growing use of hard power, weakening global institutions, and the spread of authoritarianism. Eight decades of relative peace in Europe has been shattered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China’s behavior in its neighborhood is increasingly bellicose, and the Middle East is further from peace than ever. An American Administration entering office committed to restraint in the use of force, collective action, and increased focus on China finds itself in the familiar position of reassuring allies and friends, deterring multiple adversaries, and trying to build stability on three fronts.
What is distinctive about these challenges, however, is the decline in U.S. soft power. Questions regarding the future role of the United States on the international stage, its competence in making and implementing tough policy choices, its willingness and capability for global leadership, and its democratic performance and resilience at home have been raised with unparalleled urgency by allies and friends, while adversaries look for opportunities in the spaces created by America’s polarized politics and growing isolationism.
In any endeavor to address these challenges, it will be critical to think about the world as demanding a synthesis of hard and soft power, and to understand that our soft power decline is of greater urgency than a largely illusory hard power deficit.
Attraction Matters
Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’ at the end of the Cold War. Today, as another era has come to an end and the world is witnessing another Zeitenwende, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz memorably puts it, soft power has lost none of its potency. On the contrary, even in the context of renewed great-power competition and ongoing global power shifts, sometimes termed the return of history, soft power remains a vital force in our present information age. Its success or failure, however, crucially depends on the perception of others—and here, the United States is facing severe challenges. In fact, with the United States still miles ahead in terms of key hard power resources, including its military spending, the one facet of power that seems to be under fire in particular is soft power, not least in the eyes of its allies.
In a transatlantic perspective, the presidential election in November will in many ways be crucial for how the United States is perceived around the world.
First, personalities matter in soft power projection. A potential return of Donald Trump to the White House will wreak havoc on American attraction in the eyes of Western European allies. Trump’s presidential stint from 2017 to 2021 constitutes a sure sign in this regard: as polls conducted by the Pew Research Institute have shown, the image of the United States suffered severely in Western Europe due to the policies championed by his administration, due to a loss of trust and credibility, and not least due to the personality and leadership style of the president himself. The election and inauguration of Joe Biden, on the other hand, contributed to a distinct recovery of U.S. favorability. Yet we are now witnessing, in the six month delay in Ukraine assistance, how much damage an out-of-office Trump with his stranglehold on the Republican Party can do to American credibility and reputation.
Second, the American democratic system itself has for centuries been a gushing spring of U.S. soft power. Today, this system is under severe attack from enemies both foreign and domestic. Externally, the world is currently experiencing a resurgence of authoritarianism. The diverse influence campaigns by external actors on the 2020 election are but one expression of the new-found assertiveness of these actors. Additionally, unprecedented strain has been put on the U.S. electoral system by internal forces, as election results have been repeatedly called into question—with sweeping consequences. Long gone, apparently, are the days in which a U.S. presidential election constituted “not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom,” as John F. Kennedy so memorably put it at his inauguration in 1961. The integrity of the election, therefore, will be key for the future of U.S. soft power.
Third is the abundant evidence of America’s incompetence in making and carrying out foreign policy decisions involving the threat or use of hard power. Credibility is essential in realizing benefits from our superior hard power, by deterring adversaries and reassuring allies and friends. Enemies must believe our red lines; allies must have confidence we will honor our commitments over the long term, but without dragging them into unnecessary wars of choice. Recent American foreign policy is replete with mistakes of both omission and commission. Iraq (in which every conceivable mistake was on display, and is still in evidence), Afghanistan (coming and going), ignoring our own chemical weapons red line in Syria, President-and candidate-Trump’s threats to withdraw from NATO, now the failure of the Republican Party to so much as hold a prompt vote on assistance for Ukraine. What is missing here is not hard power, but the political commitment to submit decisions on the use of force to constitutional checks and balances, the analytical capacity to estimate our hard power and its useability in complex situations, to get the intelligence-policy relationship right, to weigh the costs and benefits of alternate courses of action, and in the case of Ukraine, to forge a bipartisan consensus on priorities and overall strategy. These are missing attributes of American soft power, and their absence emboldens our enemies, and causes our allies to hedge their bets.
Europe Must Act – Regardless
Europe must prepare to step up to the plate—and not only if Trump 2.0 becomes a reality. Even a second term of Joe Biden in the White House, while certainly beneficial for the future of U.S. soft power and global commitment, could not hide the fact that Europe must increase its contribution to the defense of democracy, prosperity, and peace—around the world and on its very own doorstep. So far, it has largely missed the chance to learn its lessons.
The United States, on the other hand, should keep in mind that attraction in global politics is not circumstantial. Any country, and especially one with long-standing claims to global leadership, should also draw on soft power to get desired outcomes in a world that is increasingly hostile.
America’s transatlantic allies have long been a vital factor for her position of power—and attraction is a strong tie to keep them close, much stronger than coercion or payment could ever be.
Dr. Hendrik W. Ohnesorge is Managing Director of the Center for Global Studies at the University of Bonn and a Non-Resident Fellow at the NYU SPS Center for Global Affairs.
Professor Michael F. Oppenheimer leads the International Relations Futures concentration at the Center for Global Affairs, a Master’s program at the School of Professional Studies at New York University.
Together, they are working on a new book examining the relationship between soft and hard power, especially in the transatlantic context.
Trump & Biden is by Emma Kaden and is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.
