Who’s Invited? Selecting Attendees at the Summit for Democracy
By Taehwa Hong
U.S. President Joseph Biden pledged to restore democracy and human rights to the forefront of American diplomacy. The Trump administration’s disregard for value diplomacy created profound uncertainty over the nature of America’s global leadership. While shared interests are at the core of U.S. alliances, the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony is increasingly murky. It is evident that the U.S. will continue to compete against China in the coming decades; it is less clear if the competition is just about Bismarckian balance of power or also about values and norms.
As a presidential candidate, Biden promised to organize a global Summit for Democracy, which will focus on three areas: fighting corruption, defending against authoritarianism, and advancing human rights. The Summit for Democracy should be employed as a forum to coordinate how to advance basic human rights and the liberal world order. In addition to helping furbish democratic political governance, the Summit is also expected to target tax havens, corruption and inequality.
While there is a near universal consensus on the need to establish a forum on global democracy, experts disagree on who should be invited. One could argue that it is easier for America to reach a consensus with other participants in a meeting of advanced democratic states, presenting a united, powerful coalition against authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, extending invitations to weak democracies could legitimize nominal democracies who have the functions and structure of a democracy but are authoritarian in nature. However, the Summit’s priority target audience should be countries that are on a precarious balance between authoritarianism and democracy - those who are yet to clearly choose their mode of governance.
First, an excessively high standard on democratic governance as a precondition for membership could turn the Summit into an exclusive group of European, North American and some Asian countries. Inviting imperfect democracies will allow the Summit to focus on exactly where its attention should be: battlegrounds between liberalism and illiberalism. A small group of advanced democracies are better suited to pass resolutions and issue joint statements, but it would be confined to the comfort zone of states that already have liberal governance. Hosting an open, honest dialogue on the scope, definition and application of democracy in the 21st century would be more fruitful with countries that have different conditions from Western Europe. Nations such as Turkey and Pakistan, both officially professing democracy, should be invited on the conditions that they produce tangible domestic reforms beforehand. The standard should be realistic, in accordance with the current conditions of their internal politics.
Second, a Summit that encompasses imperfect democracies could provide a powerful leverage and incentive to elicit liberalization. A few weeks after the U.S. presidential election, Turkish President Erdogan promised major economic, legal and human rights reforms. The Biden administration could hold Turkey’s eligibility at the Summit as an incentive for Erdogan to fulfill his commitments. Sudan, which showed impressive progress in political liberalization in the last few years, would be further incentivized to accommodate reforms. Excessively strict requirements for attendance could alienate nations that are on balance between liberalism and illiberalism. A comprehensive discussion on specific countries’ governance could prevent the meeting from turning into a free pass for emerging and declining democracies. As demonstrated in the cases of Post-WWII Germany and Japan, states with previous democratic experience - albeit an imperfect one - fare better in transitioning to a full-fledged democracy than their historically autocratic counterparts. Washington should encourage fledgling and waning democracies to realign with liberal governance, using their current system as a starting point. By clearly characterizing the meeting as the Summit for Democracy rather than a Summit of Democracies, the Biden administration can avoid inadvertently legitimizing governments that are reluctant to liberalize further.
Third, a broader coalition will provide a powerful contrast to the authoritarian regimes’ parochial network of partnerships that rely not on common values but on transactional gains. As the Trump administration’s State Department Policy Planning Staff noted, autocracies face endemic difficulties in forming and maintaining alliances. Authoritarian states may have overlapping interests but no shared values like those that bind the EU, NATO and America’s Asian allies. China and Russia, the two strongest revisionists forces, deeply distrust each other - emulating the Transatlantic “special relationship” between the U.S. and the UK is impossible. The Summit for Democracy that invites a broad spectrum of burgeoning and mature democracies will show how it’s easier to have friends and partners as a democracy.
To that end, the U.S. State Department should work with close allies to layout the rules and topics the Summit will cover. As the Summit would be President Biden’s brainchild, he should consider offering to chair the first meeting. America should also approach potential attendants - with many nations expected to be eager to show up - with transparent and concrete conditions for invitation. While a universal, standardized condition could be one option for the sake of fairness, Washington should also take into account the vastly different political climates in each nation. Considering the current rate of reform and domestic motivation for further changes in respective countries, the Biden administration could devise different conditions tailored for each of them. In the process, Washington should be careful not to turn the invitation offer as a bargaining chip for geopolitical gains - something the previous administration was too willing to do.
Additionally, the Biden administration needs to engage the civil society. The Summit should not be reserved just for state actors. It should invite NGOs, civil rights activists, think tanks and scholars. A successful transition into and consolidation of democratic governance requires not only the will of the elite and the establishment but also an accommodative understanding from the general population. This requires much investment into the civil society. Former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul argued that the participants at the Summit should establish a new doctrine on “social media regulation, R&D cooperation among democracies, the right to assist democrats working in non-democracies." The Biden administration could also create a “digital market matching donors and civil society groups'', like an “eBay or Craigslist for democracy”; there, foreign donors can support burgeoning civil society groups, human rights activists and journalists.
Four years of Donald Trump diplomacy relied mostly on America’s unilateral geopolitical power and weight. If President Biden seeks to reinvent American foreign policy to lead the world through the “power of our example, not the example of power,” he will have to carefully design the Summit for Democracy. In choosing which countries to invite, the Biden administration should appeal to the merits of inclusion rather than the pressure of exclusion.
Taehwa Hong is Staff Sergeant in the Republic of Korea Air Force, on leave from Stanford University. He was formerly Research Assistant at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and Inern at both Israel’s Institute of National Security Studies and the Korea Economic Institute of America. His research focuses on East Asia and international security. The views expressed are his own and not of any organizations he is or was affiliated with.
“Joe Campaigning” is by stingrayschuller and is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
