A Land for Peace Settlement in Ukraine: Is It Time to Think About It?
By Ambassador David L. Carden
There’s much speculation on how the war in Ukraine could end. Ukraine’s advances on the battlefield have given many hope that it can win. Others assert that over the long term, Russia’s superior domestic resources and Putin’s personal stake in an outcome acceptable to him make it unlikely he’ll accept defeat, leading either to catastrophic escalation, or a ruinous stalemate. While fortunate, Ukraine’s recent military momentum complicates the picture. A Ukrainian overture to negotiate now could be founded on unrealistic expectations, and a Russian acceptance misperceived as weakness. The question thus becomes, how, and when, to attempt to negotiate a settlement.
It's with this question in mind that Putin’s recent “referenda” in the Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk, Luhansk, and parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, should be considered. The referenda, which were conducted in clear violation of international law and Ukrainian sovereignty, were designed to “justify” their absorption into the Russian Federation. They understandably led to worldwide condemnation. But despite the unlawfulness of the referenda, it’s important to ask if Putin’s irredentist gambit has opened an opportunity to mediate a successful resolution of his war by exchanging some territory for a real and durable peace. In order to evaluate this possibility, it’s first important to understand the role of sovereignty in foreign affairs, and ask whether it should be given the same primacy it has enjoyed, especially since World War II.
The Treaty of Westphalia, entered into by the warring kingdoms of Europe in 1648 to end the Eighty and Thirty-Years Wars, is credited with having established the modern nation-state and enshrining the concept of territorial sovereignty. The treaty was designed to end a conflict that had ravaged Europe for the better part of a century and established boundaries among 300 different European kingdoms. Unfortunately, the peace was ephemeral. Between 1648 and the Second World War, hostile forces regularly invaded and occupied most of the kingdoms. As a result, Europe today has only 44 countries, which, given the relatively small scale of the continent's land mass, is a testament to the relative endurance and importance of sovereignty.
Since World War II, transborder incursions in Europe have become rare. Putin’s invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, his seizure of Crimea, and the fratricidal conflict in the Balkans, are a few examples. Various theories have been advanced for this dramatic reduction in cross-border conflict: the balance of power and deterrence that persisted during the Cold War, the “Big Mac Theory” that posited, perhaps too casually, that “democracies don’t fight one another,” and the formation of alliances and other security communities. The rest of the world has experienced a similar decrease in transborder incursions, with China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974 a notable exception.
The stability of borders in the post-World War II period has been one of the real success stories of post-war foreign policy. Thus, it’s understandable why Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been condemned by most right-thinking governments and leaders around the world. In decrying the invasion, the world has reaffirmed its adherence to the fundamental premise of the Treaty of Westphalia, which is that borders matter. This approach is based on the scars it bears from the painful lessons of modern history and an awareness of the dire consequences that have followed when aggressors violate the borders of their neighbors. Neville Chamberlain’s ill-fated effort to appease Nazi Germany, sacrificing Sudetenland after Hitler promised to make no more territorial demands, remains the paradigmatic diplomatic and strategic miscalculation.
But the world has changed since Chamberlain. The forces that arguably led to exalting sovereignty in the post-war period either have disappeared, as in the case of the Cold War, or are not as strong as they once were, as with the worldwide weakening of democratic governance. This arguably might lead to more frequent violations of sovereignty. But no matter where borders are drawn, they no longer offer the protection they once did. Countries acting alone behind their borders cannot address current cross-border global challenges, such as climate change, human migration and, pandemics. Nor can they create and maintain global markets in essential commodities and resources, including food and energy. Indeed, fixation on the sanctity of borders is more likely to lead to the failure to respond to shared challenges, and to catastrophic global shortages.
Given the magnitude of the borderless challenges facing the world, and the urgency needed to address them collectively, an objective analysis of the war suggests the advisability (or at least the willingness) to evaluate whether there might be some price to pay for peace. Under certain circumstances, trading portions of the provinces in which Putin conducted his “referenda” for peace would make logical sense given what is at stake, unless there’s a viable military path to total victory available to Ukraine, which remains an open question. A trade also would not make sense if “rewarding” Putin’s illegal and murderous aggression were to increase the likelihood of future cross-border incursions by him, and others, that would disrupt the global conversation the world desperately needs. Many share this justifiable concern.
But it’s important not to convert concerns into conclusions. Rather, as Ukraine evaluates the wisdom of considering a land-for-peace formula, the weight it gives to the principle of territorial sovereignty should be balanced against the risks generated or exacerbated by sustained or escalating war and violence. Its evaluation also requires an assessment of what might be obtained in any trade. Surely, it would need to include more than a cessation of hostilities, lest it be evanescent. Rather, a long-term plan would require providing Ukraine, at a minimum, with the tools it needs to accelerate its economic reconstruction and consolidate a credible deterrent against future aggression. In this regard, it is important to remember peace, security, and prosperity are mutually reinforcing.
If Ukraine were to move towards sustainable economic development and real prosperity, it not only would help provide for its future defense, but also increase the number of partners invested in its future, which could serve as a partial deterrent against future aggression. A comprehensive redevelopment plan financed by global stakeholders would re-anchor Ukraine and its friendly neighbors in a Western-oriented economic architecture. Russian governmental assets and those of Russia’s oligarchs seized in connection with the war could be converted and used for Ukraine’s reconstruction. A tax on future Russian exports could be imposed. European Union and NATO memberships could be considered as a component of a durable security framework, and would likely be part of Ukraine’s negotiating position. Ukraine’s military has certainly proven its potential value to the NATO alliance.
What is the alternative? An ultimate Ukrainian “victory”, at whatever cost, even if it could be achieved, with a hostile and perpetually-aggrieved former superpower on its border supporting a domestic insurgency? Or a Russian “victory”, however it’s defined, that would impose great costs not only on the Russian and Ukrainian people, but upon the world, now and long into the future? Or a stalemate, resulting in the needless deaths of tens of thousands more Ukrainians and Russians; the displacement of millions of refugees that increases the economic and social burden on Central and Eastern European countries; the continued devastation of Ukraine’s countryside and cities; the disruption of global food and energy supplies; the weakening of global financial markets, resulting in lost wealth for some and economic devastation for others; and the continued erosion of the collective action needed to address global challenges. Of these, the shadow of a long stalemate looms the largest.
Of course, Putin and his nationalist enablers would have to be willing to accept a land for peace trade. But analysts should be exploring whether his ersatz referenda might have been something of an overture to this end. Whether they were or were not, it stands to reason that at some point, Putin will be willing to make a trade given his compounding strategic miscalculations, Russia’s battlefield failures, and the unpopularity of his conscription policy for Russian men. In addition, the loss of so many Russians to war, and the continuing flight from conscription, will exacerbate Russia’s future demographic and economic challenges. Russia already has one of the lowest total fertility rates in the world, at 1.58. Ukraine has a similar incentive to stop the killing and emigration: its fertility rate is even lower at 1.47.
Some will hold tight to their position that ceding territory to Putin would only lead to another Sudetenland, Georgia, or Crimea. Perhaps they are right. Perhaps not. But at the moment, Ukraine and its supporters need to decide whether they should consider opening the door to the possibility of a trade of some land for lasting peace. Doing so when Ukraine has battlefield momentum could be the most courageous and prudent course for the country to take. The alternative is to keep the negotiation door shut based on the historic and reflexive primacy of the principle of territorial sovereignty, with potentially catastrophic consequences.
The world doesn’t know if Putin is ready for peace or would be prepared to keep it. But not knowing what Putin will do puts the burden on Ukraine and its supporters to be the responsible parties and try to find out. Soon, it may be time for them to do so.
David L. Carden served as the first resident U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. He is the author of Mapping ASEAN: Achieving Peace, Prosperity, and Sustainability in Southeast Asia and has written for Foreign Policy, Politico, the SAIS Review of International Affairs, the Guardian, the South China Morning Post, and Strategic Review, among others. He also is a mediator and serves on the Board of the Weinstein International Foundation, which promotes the use of mediation around the world.
Russia Ukraine War - Day 47: Exhumed bodies on outskirts of Kyiv is by manhhai and is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
