Safeguarding U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine

By Mitch Ruhl

“There is no Ukraine.” These remarks in 2020 by Vladislav Surkov, architect of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine policy, underpin the brutal psychology of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As Ukraine fights to expel the invaders and preserve its existence, the United States has supplied Ukraine USD 43 billion in military aid since 2022. This aid was critical in enabling Ukrainian survival in the opening months of the war and in recapturing territory in the 2022 counteroffensive. However, the provision of aid from the United States is facing an increasingly tenuous position. The broader American public has become increasingly disillusioned while a small, but influential, isolationist faction in the U.S. Congress threatens future aid legislation. But why should the United States continue to support Ukraine? The United States must continue to expand military aid to Ukraine within Ukraine’s strategic and operational needs to prevent genocide, restore global deterrence, and, most importantly, restore peace to Ukraine.

Firstly, under the international Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, the United States has a moral and legal obligation to aid the Ukrainian people against the genocidal policies, actions, and rhetoric of the Russian state and its surrogates. Despite Russia’s veto power on any potential collective R2P-based response via the United Nations Security Council, the United States’ unilateral moral obligation under the framework does not end. Observers agree that patterns of systemic massacres, abductions, eliminationist rhetoric, and "Russification" policies clearly point to a genocidal campaign, one that demands action to support Ukrainian resistance.

Additionally, it is critical that the United States restores deterrence against wars of aggression. On one hand, this war is a failure of U.S. deterrence, as it did not prevent it. It is important to note that U.S. military aid is unlikely to deter Russian revanchism despite the significant losses incurred in Ukraine, as evidenced by the Kremlin’s March 2023 attempt to stage a coup in Moldova. On the other hand, this war is a success story of deterrence by resilience. Russia is less likely to use war as a revanchist tool in the near future as an estimated 97 percent of the Russian armed forces are committed to the invasion of Ukraine. More importantly, U.S. military aid serves to deter other neo-imperialist powers, such as the People's Republic of China, which is learning from Russia’s war with an eye toward Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.

Furthermore, there are arguments that U.S. aid is prolonging the conflict. These claims generally fall into two camps. One such argument embraced by realist scholars—such as Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer—holds that the mere act of military aid discourages peace talks from occurring. This position is weak and immoral: it rewards Russian aggression by withholding aid from and seeking to impose concessions on the victim, thereby enabling future aggression. The other argument holds that the Biden administration’s gradualist approach has impeded Ukraine’s ability to retake its territory, thereby extending the conflict. The latter rests on more solid ground.

Given that Putin’s and the siloviki’s (Russia’s security service strongmen) political power relies on militarism, peace will remain elusive so long as they hold power. However, while their position is not as weak as the West hopes, various independent analyses indicate it is not as strong as the Kremlin projects, as evidenced by the Wagner Group insurrection. Though Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin overestimated his ability to rally disillusioned Russians to his cause, the sheer attempt as well as Putin’s concessions—unit preservation, pardons, relocation—reveal war-induced cracks in the regime’s stability, regardless of the circumstances behind Prigozhin’s death. Enabling Ukrainian battlefield success through expanded military aid would further weaken siloviki power.

Notwithstanding the remarkable zeal of Ukrainian defiance, U.S. materiel support was critical for maintaining resistance as Ukraine lacks the domestic arms industry to independently sustain its military. Yet to Kyiv’s frustration, Washington has slow-walked delivery of the necessary systems and munitions, primarily due to escalation and military-readiness concerns. Notable examples include Unmanned Aerial Systems, tanks, and fighter jets. This gradualist approach unfortunately has prolonged the conflict. Earlier access to these systems could have achieved greater gains in Ukraine’s counteroffensives. Washington should now place greater weight on strengthening Ukraine’s offensive capabilities by restoring maneuverability and breakthrough potential.

Expanding aid and shifting away from gradualism are essential in achieving the United States’ and Ukraine’s mutual goals in this conflict. The ongoing counteroffensive has struggled to meet its objectives due to deeply-entrenched Russian lines and some key shortcomings. Ukraine faces a challenging munitions crisis partly because Western planners expected an unrealized return to combined-arms maneuvers, a problem reminiscent of the 1915 Shell Crisis. The current shortage forced the Biden administration to partially loosen its gradualist approach through the supply of cluster munitions, which aided in defensive operations near Kharkiv and supported advances in the south. 

Beyond increasing munitions production and expanding deliveries, the longer-term solution rests in restoring battlefield maneuverability. While the United States has strengthened Ukraine’s high-to-medium altitude air defense (HIMAD) systems, Russia’s own defenses mitigate opportunities for Ukrainian counter-land attack. Ukraine’s exhausted short-range air defenses (SHORAD) also leaves advancing Ukrainian units vulnerable to Russian air attack. Ukrainian forces cannot offset these attacks with man-portable systems, such as Stingers, due to Russian air forces’ standoff tactics. Washington should invest in disrupting and penetrating Russian air defenses and improving the Ukrainian army’s SHORAD capabilities. Reinvesting in the United States’ long-neglected SHORAD production and increasing high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM) system and F-16 jet deliveries would be invaluable in shifting the balance.

Minefields present another major obstacle that Ukraine is not sufficiently equipped to address. Expanding sapper (demining) training and supplying more demining equipment and mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles are critical. At present, only an estimated 200 Ukrainian sappers are trained to an international level, with only a few thousand overall. An August 2023 aid package included      demining equipment, but it may not be enough. Notably, MRAPs appear to have the greatest short-term potential, as demonstrated in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast region.

Most materiel and services sent to Ukraine are via the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), allowing the President to send materiel from U.S. military stocks at minimal taxpayer cost. While there is a risk of dipping too deep into military stocks, that concern is manageable via oversight. By virtue of its alliances, arms industry, and geostrategic location, the United States has a degree of flexibility. The major hurdle is appropriations.

Military and diplomatic considerations cannot be extricated from civil and political sentiments. For example, in the 1930s, the U.S. Senate’s Nye Committee, influenced by widespread isolationist sentiment, investigated the “Merchants of Death” conspiracy theory, which claimed that arms manufacturers pressured the U.S. government into entering World War I. Despite the committee’s lack of evidentiary findings, it inspired the codification of U.S. neutrality between 1935 and 1941. More recently, isolationist trends resurged after the War on Terror and the resulting resentment toward “forever wars.” Just prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion, public sentiment regarding U.S. support for Ukraine was very low, with a majority of the public distrusting intelligence reports of a looming invasion. Yet one month later, U.S. support for Ukraine soared, with about 74 percent of Americans across the political spectrum in favor of providing Ukraine with significant aid.

Republican support of U.S.-Ukraine aid has since dropped to just 34 percent, with a plurality favoring aid reduction. In contrast, Democratic support for aid provision remains relatively high at 63 percent and only 14 percent favoring reduced aid. This shift has been driven by concerns over domestic challenges, “forever war” fears and conspiracy theories, and former U.S. President Donald Trump’s influence. Congressionally, broad bipartisan support persists and may dilute the effect of an empowered isolationist minority. The pro-Ukraine chairs of key committees in the U.S. House of Representatives—Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, and Armed Services—are likely to support further aid legislation. However, the 2024 presidential election brings further uncertainty, with prominent presidential candidates opposing aid provisions. Mitigating a possible winter of isolationism requires both the legislative and the executive branches to leverage this moment in history to maximize Ukraine’s strength.

Though the announcement of U.S.-Ukraine joint weapons production represents a positive development, the President has additional options to support Ukraine’s military, independent of Congress. Another tool beyond the PDA is the as-of-yet unused Excess Defense Articles program, which gives the Pentagon broad discretion in transferring arms to foreign governments. Further, the U.S. Department of State could expand its support of Ukraine’s procurement capacity through more Foreign Military Financing, which has an unobligated balance of USD 4.6 billion in fiscal year 2023.

Ultimately, responsibility lies most heavily with the holders of the purse. The outsized influence of the isolationist faction, now backed by newly-chosen Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, succeeded in omitting Ukraine aid in the most recent continuing resolution. To preempt further isolationist obstruction, pro-Ukraine representatives should raise a Ukraine aid bill to the House floor as “privileged business.” Following a favorable Appropriations Committee report, a timely vote can be ensured through suspending the rules of consideration, reporting a special rule for consideration of the bill, or utilizing an open amendment process with no points of order against the bill waived. It is critical that Congress pass aid legislation without delay.

As the shadow of Munich suggests, appeasing an aggressor only enables more aggression. To balk in the face of Russia’s threats of escalation (even nuclear saber-rattling) is to condone further belligerence and crimes against humanity by Russia and other would-be aggressors. Gradualism only increases the likelihood of a “forever war” and greater suffering for the Ukrainian people. Abandoning gradualism and expanding deliveries would empower more breakthrough and exploitation opportunities. Thus, Congress and the President must act to strengthen further aid for Ukraine’s military in the short and long term.

Mitch Ruhl is a national security specialist based in Washington, D.C. He is passionate about twentieth and twenty-first century military history, foreign and defense policy, its relationship with politics and society, and transatlantic relations. He holds a master’s degree in Modern History from the University of Kent in the United Kingdom. The views expressed in this article are his alone and do not reflect the position of any affiliated organization.

“President Joe Biden visits Kyiv, Ukraine, Feb. 20, 2023” is by U.S. Embassy Kyiv Ukraine and is licensed under CC BY-ND 2.0 DEED.