Beyond 2020: The Past and Next Fifty Years of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
By Niranjan Jose
2020 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s entry into power and the twenty-fifth anniversary of its indefinite extension. This year also marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the first and only use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime, but its internal irregularities are becoming increasingly problematic.
The upcoming 2020 review meeting will occur in a particularly unstable global environment because of two significant issues: the U.S. abandonment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and the planned denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The current course of events suggests that the NPT has arrived at the limit of its potential regarding its non-proliferation objectives. However, the NPT’s existence has convincingly demonstrated the efficacy of its balanced structure of commitments in three key areas: nuclear non-proliferation, the peaceful use of atomic energy and disarmament.
This structure played a central role in stalling the spread of nuclear weapons and established the framework for consistent development towards nuclear disarmament, and the advancement of universal participation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. It can appropriately be considered as an instance of a viable arena for interaction between members from the international community in beating global difficulties through multilateral diplomacy.
States in Asia and the Pacific have been at the frontline of global endeavors to implement the NPT. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) was initially proposed by Iran, and it was later formalized by a 1974 UN General Assembly resolution.
Friction among the NPT parties became particularly apparent on July 7, 2017 when 122 NPT signatories cast a ballot for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which embraced the objective of prohibiting every nuclear weapon, including those controlled by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states.
The TPNW is one indication of the NPT's midlife meltdown due to the dissatisfaction of non-nuclear weapon states regarding the slow disarmament progress. For its backers, the TPNW is an endeavor to give atomic demobilization some vitality. On the other hand, nations opposing the TPNW—including NATO Allies—argue that thetreaty be ineffective, and that it also risks undermining the NPT.
In the end, it might be workable for NPT signatories to discover a solution and settle on a middle ground in the new treaty.
Focusing on three areas could help mitigate these developing challenges. First, there needs to be an understanding of the measures to diminish motivating forces for states to hold, obtain, or increment their stockpile of atomic weapons. Next, there is a need for the establishment of institutions and procedures to reinforce, restrain, and manufacture trust in atomic disarmament. Finally, measures need to be put in place to lessen the probability of nuclear war among weapons-holders before such weapons are eliminated.
The system has continually advanced and adjusted to new realities, and continued to increase its responsiveness to difficulties in the sphere of nuclear non-proliferation. While the NPT will endure, the validity of the system has been seriously harmed by the inflexibility of parties and the rise of hazardous new tendencies.
These include an unchecked resurgence of the salience of nuclear weapons in European security, obstacles against the disposal and destruction of nuclear weapons, increasing strife both between and among non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear weapons states, further deteriorating trust in the NPT by Arab states, and a general loss of credibility in the nuclear disarmament objective of the NPT.
Over the past few decades, there has been an overall discernment among NPT observers that the Treaty is malfunctioning and is in danger of becoming outdated, and eventually failing due to expansion challenges and debates about demilitarization. Four out of the previous nine review meetings finished without any consensus proclamations. Although the Treaty remains in force, the failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference was profoundly frustrating as it squandered chances to propel the goals and objectives of the NPT. Yet, without the NPT, up to fifty nations could have obtained atomic weapons at this point. Numerous states have surrendered atomic weapons programs and joined the NPT, recognizing that the advantages of the settlement exceeded the quest for an atomic stockpile.
The Trump administration’s decisions risk undoing decades of nuclear arms control post-cold war by: withdrawing from the ABM Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, engaging in the unobstructed and unilateral deployment of the U.S. global missile defense system (potentially including hostile weapons in space), continuing developing high-precision offensive weapons, and refusing to approve the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
These actions have further increased the strategic relevance of non-conventional weapons. The 2020 Review Conference will feature these issues and runs the risk not only of wrecking trust among states but also of compromising all demilitarization endeavors. As such, all member states must approach the event with an open mind regarding the future.
Niranjan Jose is a third-year law student pursuing BBA LLB from National Law University Odisha (NLUO). He is a national level debater with a keen interest in International Relations. At law school, Jose has exposed himself to a variety of subjects such as contemporary international politics, international monetary economics, and international trade law. He has presented papers at the Fifth International Conference on Social Sciences 2018 and Seventh International Conference on Asian Studies 2019 on the topics “Saudi-Iranian Cold War: Analysis and Implications” and “Turkey: Regional aspirations in the changing Middle East." At NLUO, Jose hopes to further his understanding of foreign policy, as well as the intersection of public policy, politics, and international trade strategy. In his spare time, Jose enjoys traveling..
“The 2018 Kim-Trump Summit” by CSIS is under the public domain.
