Why the Fall of Romanian Communism ended in a Double Execution
By Dylan Farley
Coups d'état are inherently unpredictable actions within the international arena. Several key trends suggest possible increases in the likelihood of coups, such as increased professionalism and organization of world militaries and the proliferation of corrupt governments. Due to their unpredictability, historical analysis remains the primary way of assessing the causes and effects of coups. One of the intriguing stated reasons of coups is the maintenance of state sovereignty and continuance of party systems, in refusal of cults of personality. The thirty-year anniversary of the fall of communism in Romania provides an excellent example for looking at the calculations behind such a course of action.
On Christmas Day in 1989, Romanian television broadcast Christmas carols for the first time in forty years. The strict communist ideology of President Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena had previously prevented overt displays of religion. But this no longer mattered, because they were executed by the transitional government earlier that day. Why did Romania’s communist transition end with the execution of the president and his wife? Context suggests that Romanian elites calculated that only through a complete break with the outgoing regime could Romania hope to achieve a refined version of communism without total collapse.
Ceausescu was the second, and last, communist leader of Romania. His believed in a form of Romanian national communism that would be independent from the Soviet yoke. This ideology created divisions among Romanian communists which led Ceausescu to “cleanse” the country’s communist party of dissidents on numerous occasions.
In order to protect his hold over Romania, Ceausescu often responded to unrest with the heavy hand of the secret police and the military. Ceausescu’s repression was often encouraged by the counsel of his wife, Elena. For example, on December 17, 1989 the third day of anti-government protests in Timisoara, it was Elena who ordered the military into the city to quell the protests. Elena was not just the First Lady, but also a member of the Politburo, an elected member of the Great National Assembly, and in 1980, the Deputy Prime Minister, which was the third highest political office in communist Romania.
On December 22, 1989, the eighth day of protests, Nicolae Ceausescu made a speech in Bucharest addressing the protests, and in the process enraged the crowds. At this point, the Ceausescus were forced to flee Bucharest, which meant that they had lost power. On December 23, the National Salvation Front officially declared control over the country and had the Ceausescus arrested.
During this time, the Minister of Defense Vasile Milea was found dead, and it was suspected that he was killed on the orders of the Ceausescus because he had refused to call on the military to shoot the protesters. Although Milea’s death was later determined to be a suicide, these suspicions caused the military to join the protests en masse and later, block any appeals from taking place during the tribunal.
The transition of power was effectively done by the end of December 23, so the execution of the Ceausescus several days later on December 25 appears unnecessary. Although tribunal president General Victor Stanculescu suggested that they were in order to prevent a mob lynching, this does not necessarily fit the wider context. Executing the Ceausescus would decrease Romania’s global standing, therefore the positive effects of the executions needed to be greater than the relative loss of prestige. The only thing that would make such actions worthwhile is the preservation of the Romanian state. In order to obtain the clean break needed for a true transition, the new government needed to eliminate the sole source of strict Romanian communist rhetoric: the Ceausescu power couple.
Romania did not fully transition from communism on December 22 or December 26. The National Salvation Front was a socialist party, as were its successors. These parties sought to build Romania within a socialist paradigm that was distinct from Ceausescu communism. There have been suggestions that NSF’s first leader, Ion Iliescu, had direct ties to Mikhail Gorbachev and was seeking to reform Romania through a version of perestroika. Earlier in December 1989, during discussions with Gorbachev, Nicolae Ceausescu had refused to reform. The revolution may have appeared to be a mandate for these reform communists to take control and improve the Romanian system.
The major obstacle to reform after December 22 was the potential response from dissidents loyal to the Ceausescus. The Ceausescus brand of Romanian communism could become a rallying point for dissidents, especially if newly reformed policies did not improve the Romanian economy. Alive, the Ceausescus could dissent against the transitional government from prison or abroad. Once executed, they could not be a rallying point, allowing Romania to move on. Between December 22 and December 25, 1989, the leaders of the transitional government must have decided that in order to institute true change, Nicolae and Elena needed to die. Romania did survive though, and is now a member of the European Union and NATO.
There are several states that remain in precarious situations in which a leader is pursuing their personal goals instead of the goals of the state. Romania is a great example of the destabilizing effect of these leaders. The international community must remain aware of these issues, and come to terms with concept that if state leaders reject their social contract, they may face violent overthrow. The future likely holds more Romanias, and the new emergent states must be guided back into the international system while coming to terms with any new dark chapters.
Dylan Farley is a U.S. Army officer who is about to graduate from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. His professional and academic background focus on influence operations and hybrid warfare as grand strategy tools. Prior to Fletcher, he earned a Bachelor's from the College of William & Mary and deployed to Djibouti and Somalia. The views are his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Army
“Propaganda poster Ceausescu” by Scott Edelman is in the public domain in the United States
