Indonesia-U.S. Garuda Shield Exercises: Strategic But Not Without Risks
By Aristyo Rizka Darmawan
In August, Indonesia and the United States conducted one of their largest annual Garuda Shield exercises. This year it was announced that there will be fourteen countries engaged in the exercises, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Japan.
The exercise, which has been conducted annually since 2009, is one of the most important exercises between Indonesia and the United States armed forces. With the increasing U.S.-China rivalry in the region, it sends a strategic message to China; however, there is also a risk that follows.
With the current geopolitical uncertainty, the exercise has become more important and significant over the last several years. Last year, for instance, claimed to be one of the largest exercises in the history of Garuda Shield; it was reported that 2,161 personnel from the Indonesian Army and 1,547 from the US Army were involved in the exercise.
Considering the uncertain geopolitical conditions in the South China Sea and other potential hot spots, the exercises are strategic and important for Indonesia, at least for a couple of reasons.
First, it may send a message to Beijing that Indonesia will work together with like-minded states to maintain peace and security in the region as well as to defend the rules-based international order. In recent years, there have been several incidents when the Chinese Coast Guard and Navy tried to assert their illegal nine-dash line claim in the region, including in the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea. Last year, Beijing even formally protested Indonesia's oil drilling in the Indonesian EEZ and subsequently sent its coast guard, navy, and survey vessels to maneuver near the oil rigs.
Second, the exercise not only increases the skills and practical capacity of the Indonesian armed forces, but also shows that Indonesia is capable of hosting such an important and international exercise that involves fourteen countries from all over the world. Furthermore, it also enhances the interoperability between the Indonesian armed forces and other militaries. The exercise will surely have a strategic implication on Indonesia’s position in the region.
To maintain a neutral strategic position in the region, Indonesia has explored joint exercises not only with the U.S. and its allies, but also with China. In May 2021 Indonesia and China even held a joint naval exercise close to Jakarta. However, it seems that such exercises are simple, highly scripted, and sometimes nothing more than photo opportunities. But by conducting exercises with both the U.S. and China, Jakarta is pursuing an active and independent foreign policy, and is not throwing its lot in completely with the U.S.
However, despite its strategic implications, there are some risks that could follow. First, it might provoke a response from Beijing. Last year, Beijing sent a formal letter protesting the Garuda Shield exercises and the Indonesian drilling in the North Natuna Sea for the first time. In the letter, Beijing expressed its concern with regional peace and stability. Therefore, there is also a possibility that with more countries involved this year, mostly U.S. allies from the region, China will again respond and protest the exercise. Even though it is within Indonesia’s sovereign rights to conduct such exercises, the goal is to maintain peace and security in the region and avoid unnecessary escalation and tension.
Second, Indonesia has reiterated its neutral position amidst the U.S.-China rivalry. Through its free and active foreign policy, Indonesia is trying to maintain a neutral position. Therefore, the exercise also poses some risk that Indonesia will be perceived as leaning more toward the United States and its allies for its defense. Among the fourteen countries involved in the exercise are all members of AUKUS, the U.S., the UK, and Australia, and three of the four QUAD countries: the U.S., Japan, and Australia. As such, there is the possibility that Indonesia could be seen as leaning more towards the U.S. and its allies.
Conducting such exercises does not necessarily mean that Indonesia is abandoning its neutral position or its free and active foreign policy doctrine. Indonesia and China, for instance, also conducted a bilateral navy exercise last year in the Java Sea. This shows that Indonesia is willing to cooperate with all countries, including either the U.S. or China. The Garuda Shield exercise does not necessarily mean that Indonesia is leaning toward the U.S., but instead reiterates its free and active foreign policy.
With this in mind, the recent Garuda Shield exercise has been strategically important for Indonesia and for regional peace and security. However, it risks provoking a response from Beijing, which may perceive it as a provocation, ultimately causing instability in the region. Indonesia should manage the risks by keeping communication open with Beijing, and avoiding any locations that are too sensitive.
Aristyo Rizka Darmawan is a lecturer in international law at Universitas Indonesia and Visiting Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University. His research focuses on the law of the sea and maritime security in Southeast Asia. He holds a master’s in international law from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
31st MEU, Indonesian Marines conduct Maritime Raid during Super Garuda Shield is by U.S. Inso-Pacific Command and is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
