Breaking the Naval Impasse on the U.S. Icebreaker Program
By Max Schreiber
America’s military vessels brave contested waters, hurricanes, tropical storms, and other chaos—so why is the presence of U.S. Navy ships in the Arctic so limited? The Arctic, after all, is no longer just vast icebergs floating around like sentinels of death, surrounded by silence more oppressive than its cold—it is now a major geopolitical prize in the Great Power Competition between the United States, China, and Russia.
The Arctic has relevance to every facet of this struggle. Energy? The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that one-eighth of the world’s untapped oil reserves and one-third of its natural gas reserves lie in the Arctic. Trade? The Arctic’s three trade routes—the Northwest Passage (above Canada), the Northern Sea Route (above Russia), and the Central Arctic Route (between Iceland and the Bering Strait, through the North Pole)—will soon subsume a substantial share of shipping, by some accounts five percent of global maritime traffic in 2030 and with no sign of slowing down. Political-military risk? The Russian Navy’s elite Northern Fleet recently expanded its area-of-responsibility specifically to secure the Northern Sea Route, and China proclaimed itself a “near Arctic” state as it begins to establish a “Polar Silk Road” of influence and commerce in the region (“near” does a lot of work there). In fact, China and Russia are cooperating in the Arctic, as evidenced by their joint naval patrol near the U.S. Aleutian Islands in 2023.
The Great Powers in the Arctic
The Great Power Competition in the Arctic will be won with icebreakers—highly specialized naval vessels capable of slicing directly through polar ice that would crush traditional ships and withstanding “storms that can ice over superstructures until ships become so top-heavy they capsize.” Currently, complete exploration, shipping, and patrol of the Arctic is impossible without them. Yet, there is a stark imbalance among the Great Powers in their icebreaking capabilities. China, located 800 miles away from the Arctic at its closest point, operates two existing icebreakers (with a third on the way) and is developing nuclear-powered technology for these vessels. Russia has a fleet of forty-six icebreakers, including three nuclear-powered ships for extended Arctic patrols, and has recently launched a new “class of combat icebreakers with high-speed guns and launchers for anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.” Both Russia and China have centralized their icebreaker programs under their navies, underscoring their view of these ships as military assets.
In contrast, America’s icebreaker program is in disarray. The U.S. government has only two operational icebreakers—the decades-old Polar Star and the Healy—and neither of them are capable of year-round operations. Plans to build a new fleet of six to nine icebreakers, through the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, are faltering. This joint venture between the Navy and Coast Guard is vastly over budget and behind schedule, already exceeding procurement cost by 39 percent, with the first delivery expected in 2029—four years late. Unlike Russia and China, the U.S. has no serious plan to equip its developing icebreakers with nuclear power. Moreover, while the Navy has some involvement in procurement and construction of the icebreakers, the Coast Guard alone is responsible for their operations. This is important because the Navy is the U.S. military’s forward-deployed, combat-oriented force, while the Coast Guard is structured primarily for homeland defense. This organizational divide means that the purpose, posture, and operational reach of America’s icebreakers are dangerously mismatched with those of its primary adversaries in the Arctic.
The Need for a U.S. Navy Icebreaker Program
Accordingly, the U.S. Congress and the President must enact legislation requiring the Navy to build and operate its own combat-oriented icebreaker program to secure our national interests in the Arctic. The Navy is unlikely to take on this role voluntarily. In 2023, the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, underscored this reluctance when he deflected questions about icebreaker procurement to the Coast Guard, making it clear that he did not view the program as the Navy's responsibility. Currently, the Coast Guard is the only branch of the U.S. military legally tasked with “develop[ing], establish[ing], maintain[ing], and operat[ing] icebreaking facilities.” Without a mandate, the Navy has shown no intention to expand its footprint into the icebreaking business. Notably, Gilday’s 2022 Navigation Plan, which outlines the Navy’s strategic goals through 2045, does not even acknowledge the Arctic as a major global maritime shipping route, nor does it identify potential geographic choke points in the region. In 2020, then-Secretary of the Navy, Kenneth Braithwaite, acknowledged the importance of icebreakers in front of Congress, but stated that “it is not a mission that is central to the United States Navy” and is one it “rel[ies] on the Coast Guard to provide.” However, leaving this critical program solely with the Coast Guard—a service with less than 10 percent the Navy’s size and budget—neglects U.S. strategic interests in the Arctic.
U.S. presence in the Arctic requires a robust naval combat capability which the Coast Guard cannot provide alone. In his 2001 commentary on the differences between the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, Professor Colin Gray of the Naval War College identified three unique characteristics of the Navy, all of which are implicated by the icebreaker program.
First, the Navy “takes its tune … from control (even command) of the high seas.” This means the first duty of “the premier navy, is to control sea lines of communication—to allow or deny access to the sea, thence across it, and finally to the land, where humankind lives.” However, without an active icebreaker presence in the Arctic, the Navy is voluntarily denying itself full access to the Arctic leaving gaps for its adversaries—namely Russia and China, to aggressively expand and militarize their icebreaker presence.
Second, the Navy’s commitment to “boldly go … where great navies have feared to sail” is undermined by its repudiation of icebreaking operations. Failing to establish a surface presence in the Arctic with icebreakers could yield an “asymmetric [] equalizer” for adversaries, a risk that becomes more imminent as polar ice melts and access to the Arctic increases.
Third, and most importantly, “the navy of a superpower that aspires to protect commerce and international order globally has no responsible choice other than to pursue excellence virtually wherever military science takes it, however serendipitously.” Russia and China are actively moving the Great Power Competition to the Arctic: Russia is arming its icebreakers with anti-ship weapons and cruise missiles, both nations are regularly patrolling the Arctic seas with icebreakers, and heavily investing in nuclear technology for these vessels. While icebreakers are certainly necessary for the Coast Guard’s missions—including search and rescue, navigation, environmental protection, interdiction, and ice operations—Russia and China have embraced icebreakers as dual-use assets that squarely address the Navy’s purpose. Moreover, the Navy and Air Force’s existing submarine and aircraft presence in the Arctic is inadequate for the Great Power Competition. Submarines and aircraft alone cannot “clear a path for critical shipping, respond to oil spills, or conduct maritime safety and security boardings in the U.S. Arctic”—let alone accomplish more strategic goals of sea control and power projection in the region.
Separately from the mission, Congress and the President should also require an independent Navy icebreaker program due to the Coast Guard’s ongoing struggles in procuring and constructing the vessels. This summer, the United States recently signed the ICE Pact with Finland and Canada to build seventy to ninety new icebreakers over the next decade. While this agreement will help expand America’s icebreaker fleet, it relies on Finland—which can build a polar-class vessel in two years at just 25 percent of the cost of in America—to handle construction. This outsourcing is, frankly, an embarrassment. The poor outcomes in the PSC program may stem in part from its joint structure: since the Coast Guard operates the icebreakers, the PSC program lacks the Navy’s full commitment. The Navy hasn’t fully leveraged its size, money, expertise and influence to drive efficiency or accelerate progress of the program, while the Coast Guard remains constrained by the Navy’s budget authority. Furthermore, each service can deflect blame onto the other in congressional oversight hearings, complicating accountability for the program’s setbacks.
In some ways, the PSC Program inverts the issues between space operators and Air Force leadership that precipitated the United States Space Force. There, space operators’ lack of independence in the DAF—which is traditionally led by pilots—meant space operations and acquisition were deprioritized. With icebreakers however, the lack of substantial direct involvement by the Navy—especially in operations—may be depriving the military of considerable influence that could expedite and improve the development of these critical vessels.
Conclusion
The Arctic is poised to become a critical arena in the Great Power Competition. Thus, to ensure the U.S. is strategically postured in this region, incoming-President Donald J. Trump should work with Congress to enact legislation mandating that the Navy build its own combat-oriented icebreaker fleet—which, upon completion, can sustain a U.S. surface warfare presence in the Arctic.
Max Schreiber is an active-duty intelligence officer with the 76 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Squadron (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base) and public interest attorney with the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute. His academic interests include executive power in foreign affairs and the use of diplomacy and pre-conflict military power to achieve national objectives; he has published on these topics in journals such as The Journal of Advanced Military Studies, Aether (the Air Force’s official strategy journal), and The Towson Journal of International Affairs. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and Duke University (electronic and computer engineering).
Icebreaker is by Matt and is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
