War Over Water: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Potential for the World’s First Modern Conflict Over Water

By Curtis Smith

Introduction

The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River by Ethiopia has sparked intense geopolitical tensions; these are most notably with Egypt, which fears significant reductions in its vital water supply. This conflict has grown into a regional dispute, with Egypt garnering Arab support and Ethiopia backed by African Union members. Historically, Egypt's claims are rooted in colonial-era treaties that excluded Ethiopia. Military threats and maneuvers by Egypt, combined with the absence of a neutral mediator, heighten the risk of this dispute escalating into the first modern war over water resources.

To mitigate this crisis, two policy actions are proposed: the formation of a Nile Basin Regulatory Commission with neutral Swiss experts to ensure balanced decision-making, and international funding for desalination projects in Egypt to secure alternative water sources and reduce conflict triggers.

Scope of Problem 

One of the foremost challenges is that there are currently no modern treaties governing water allocation or water rights with all of the Nile Basin countries as signatories. Egypt, for its part, claims that it has ancient and historic rights to the Nile and that its water allocation rights are enshrined by treaty. Egypt insists that the basis for any future negotiations on water allocation begins with the rights granted to it under its 1959 Nile Waters Treaty with Sudan. The treaty allocates 66 percent of the Nile’s water to Egypt and also grants Egypt veto power over any downstream Nile River Basin projects. Egypt insists that its water allocation not be abridged in any manner, regardless of how much seasonal rain is produced or the degree to which the river’s flow is affected.  

The first treaty that Egypt relied upon was the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, in which Britain, acting on behalf of Sudan, signed a treaty with Ethiopia delineating the borders between Ethiopia and Sudan. The second treaty upon which Egypt is basing its claim is the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, in which Britain–representing its East African colonial possessions of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda–entered into a treaty with Egypt acknowledging its ancient affiliation with the Nile.  Finally, and more importantly, Egypt is basing its allocation claim on the 1951 Nile Treaty with Sudan, in which the two nations divided the waters of the Nile between themselves.  Again, Ethiopia was not a signatory of this treaty.  

At the time of the 1951 Nile Treaty, the average annual flow of the Nile River      was estimated to be 84 billion cubic meters by Egyptian and Ethiopian officials. The Nile Water Treaty allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters, or roughly 66 percent of the Nile’s water, to Egypt; 18.5 billion cubic meters, or roughly 22 percent of water, to Sudan; and 10 billion cubic meters, or 12 percent of water, to evaporation and seepage. The treaty between the two nations also granted them both veto power over any downstream development in the Nile Basin. Ethiopia was not party to this treaty, and naturally, all of the remaining Nile Basin countries rejected it outright. 

The intransigence of Ethiopia and Egypt is rooted in the fact that each nation views the Nile River as critical. Egypt views the river from an ontological perspective; it holds great value to them historically, culturally, and even spiritually. In more practical terms, Egypt depends on the Nile for household and commercial uses and sees GERD as a major threat to its water security.  

Ethiopia, for its part, sees GERD as a representation of national unity and pride. To Ethiopia, GERD is the symbolic equivalent of Ethiopia’s victory over Italy at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. More practically, GERD will boost Ethiopia’s industrialization, considerably raise the standard of living of millions of Ethiopians, provide water and electricity to the 60 percent of the population currently without it, and provide a large source of income for the nation as it becomes an exporter of power throughout the region. While Egypt views GERD as an existential threat, Ethiopia views it as an existential necessity. 

The importance of finding a solution cannot be understated. A war over GERD      could have devastating regional consequences, and even develop into a broader Arab-African conflict. Egyptian politicians have gone on live television and discussed military options against GERD, including sending troops into Ethiopia to destroy the dam. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has threatened military action if Ethiopia touches one drop of Egyptian water, and Egypt is constantly declaring that all options are on the table. 

There have been several attempts to Arabize and Africanize the Nile. The risks of the conflict becoming a broader African-Arab regional conflict are real. Members of the Arab League held a summit in Saudi Arabia in May 2023, after which the League adopted a resolution supporting Egypt and Sudan in their dispute with Ethiopia over the dam. Ethiopia called the resolution by the Arab League an insult to the African Union and its member states, and Ethiopia also declared that the resolution ran contrary to the cherished and shared history of the people of Africa and the Arab World. 

Another potential point of conflict is that Egypt insists on maintaining its current allocation of water, regardless of variability in annual rainfall. Low annual rainfall or a regional drought could potentially lead to a conflict not sparked by Ethiopia restricting flow, but simply because of environmental changes as a result of global warming. The world could witness its first modern war over water simply due to climate change.

Currently, there are seventy-three billion cubic meters of water behind GERD, and to destroy it would devastate southern Sudan with catastrophic flooding. Finding a solution to the conflict over GERD is of paramount urgency. 

Current Policy 

All attempts to create a workable framework for water resource allocation have failed. In the 1990s, the eleven nations of the Nile Basin created the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), though this agreement was only signed by six states and ratified by four. Egypt and Sudan rejected the CFA because the framework would not allow them to keep what they have termed ‘their historic rights.’ 

A further attempt at resolution was made in 2015. A Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed on March 23, 2015, which codified the “principle not to cause significant harm,” and the “principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.” Egypt has claimed that the DOP is a binding international treaty, while Ethiopia claims that it is simply a declaration that recognizes the importance of cooperation but does not impose a duty to cooperate.  

Furthermore, the filling of GERD is in its fourth and final stage, meaning it is      nearly completed. With GERD now a foregone conclusion, Egypt has shifted its demands to requesting a formal agreement that preserves its old rights under previous treaties, including the right to veto future Nile River projects. 

Currently, there is no global superpower that the disputing parties view as honest brokers, as the dam was funded by Chinese banks, and the US has threatened to withhold development aid from Ethiopia over the dam dispute. 

Policy Alternatives

To resolve the impasse over GERD, two things are needed. First, Egypt’s water security needs must be addressed, and second, there needs to be a conflict resolution mechanism that all parties trust to be fair and equitable. 

Policy Recommendations

My first policy recommendation involves developing  a twenty-two-member Nile River Basin Commission, consisting of representatives from the eleven Nile River Basin countries, plus eleven neutral Swiss commissioners with various areas of expertise to address questions of fairness. The equal number of neutral Swiss commissioners would keep Egypt and Sudan from feeling that they are outnumbered by the nine non-Arab African members. The eleven Swiss commissioners would use their expertise to examine Nile River Basin projects, determine the various projects' impacts on water flows, and vote as neutral experts on the matter, all the while considering Egypt’s water security needs. This would allow future development decisions to be based on scientific data, rather than historical, psychological, or emotional rationale. This Commission would be based in Geneva, to further bolster its neutrality and increase the feasibility of getting participation from the neutral Swiss scientific community. The eleven commissioners coming from Africa could be based within each nation’s Swiss embassies, thus mitigating costs. 

My second policy recommendation involves funding desalination plants on the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Currently, Egypt operates 82 desalination plants, with a total capacity of 917,000 cubic meters per day. Egypt has plans to build fourteen additional desalination plants to bring total capacity to 1.4 million cubic meters per day. Egypt’s current water needs are 114 billion cubic meters annually, which means there is currently an annual deficit of 54 billion cubic meters. More desalination plants could further reduce this deficit. 

How then could additional desalination plants make up 54 billion cubic meters of annual need? They cannot, but also, they do not have to. 80 percent of Egypt’s water needs are agricultural. This means that even during seasons of low rainfall, the Nile would only have to supply 80 percent of Egypt’s water. The other 20 percent could be met by desalinated water. Fortunately, Egypt’s population has been moving away from the Nile and toward the coasts, which is where the desalination plants are located. Also, it is cheaper to utilize desalination plants than to transport water from the Nile. The desalination plants could increase Egypt’s water security, provide drinking water for its population, and mitigate the impact of drought during periods of low annual rainfall, as the Nile would only have to provide 80 percent or less of Egypt’s required water capacity. The country’s agricultural operations near the coasts could also utilize desalinated water for irrigation, and Egypt could further reduce dependence on the Nile by shifting farming operations toward coastal areas, where desalinated water would be readily available. 

In closing, my proposals would address Egypt’s water security concerns by significantly increasing the use of desalinated water for its population, while also establishing a neutral conflict resolution mechanism through a governing body that would base its votes on scientific data, rather than emotional arguments of historical rights and national pride. Utilizing these two proposals could potentially avert the world’s first modern war over water resources. 

Curtis Smith is a Master of Arts student at the Fletcher School, and a seasoned professional with extensive experience in media, finance, Global Affairs, and International Relations. Prior to attending Fletcher, he earned a Master of Arts in Global Affairs from the University of Oklahoma and a B.A. in Political Science from the Penn State University. Since 2017, he has served as Junior Vice President on the Global Executive Response Unit at Citigroup.

“GERD (Grand Ethiopian Renaissance dam), Ethiopia” is by Water Alternatives Photos and is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.