Silent Support for Ukraine in China’s Ambiguity

By Kaiming Chen

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stance on the ongoing Russian war in Ukraine remains an enigma. Although some Western commentators label the PRC’s silence as “pro-Russia neutrality,” the underlying dynamics of the PRC’s position are far more nuanced. This label implies criticism of refusing to explicitly condemn Russian aggression, although the PRC does not send weapons to support Russia, nor has it supported Russia in any United Nations votes. The reasons behind the PRC’s ambiguous official position are not simply economic concerns or fear of democratic rhetoric, which boil down to the PRC’s concern about antagonizing Russia. Indeed, there are two major, overlooked reasons that the PRC may actually support Ukraine: China’s history with Russian colonization and the PRC’s opposition to legitimizing military interference with other nations’ territorial integrity.

First, China is intimately familiar with European—specifically Russian—colonization. Through the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Treaty of Peking, czarist Russia annexed vast territories from the weakening Qing Empire, roughly forty times the size of Taiwan. The USSR also facilitated the secession of Mongolia from the Republic of China. The PRC renounced all claims to the territories annexed by Russia centuries ago, perhaps choosing to compromise with Russia in the face of their common adversary, the United States. Therefore, as a former victim of Russian expansionism, China—and now the PRC—may be sympathetic to Ukraine’s position.

The second dimension to the PRC’s ambiguity is related to its singular redline in foreign affairs: Taiwan. Russia’s  successful secede-and-annex strategy in Crimea and the Donbas region could threaten the PRC’s claim over Taiwan. Although the PRC officially rejects analogies between Ukraine and Taiwan, there is a closer analogy between Ukraine’s annexed regions—Crimean and the Donbas—and Taiwan. Both governments see them as integral parts of their sovereignty. Both territories were subjected to a foreign superpower's military might. In the case of Crimea and the Donbas, Ukraine has yet to defeat Russia. In the case of Taiwan, the United States has been defending Taiwan from any threats from the PRC since 1954.

Nonetheless, there is an essential difference between the situations in Ukraine and Taiwan. Russia justifies its aggression by proclaiming its intervention was to support ethnic self-determination—yet another reason why China is reluctant to support Russia in its war. In contrast, the United States’ supports Taiwan on an ideological basis. 

Yet, the commonality lies in how great powers intervene or exert influence in these regions. Indeed, this parallelism is why the PRC never officially recognized the Russian annexation of Crimea, let alone the republics in the Donbas. Since the start of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, the PRC's position has been to uphold "territorial integrity of all countries." In April 2023, the PRC Ambassador to France questioned the international legal status of former Soviet countries. In response, the PRC’s Foreign Ministry immediately rejected his position and reiterated China's official position promoting respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. While the PRC has never officially called for Russia to return Crimea to Ukraine, its envoy to the European Union said in an interview that "[he doesn’t] see why" China should not support Ukraine's reclamation of its 1991 territorial integrity. Given the PRC’s own difficult alliance with Russia, such a statement by an ambassador without a rejection from the Foreign Ministry may amount to diplomatic support for Ukraine.

The possibility of the PRC joining the West and sending material support to Ukraine, however, is slight for obvious reasons. For one thing, the post-Mao PRC rarely sends military aid to foreign countries, and Kyiv certainly is not an ally to Beijing. For another, Beijing seems amenable to Moscow's grievances about NATO expansion as justification for waging war against Ukraine. Lastly, the danger of a military defeat leading to regime change in Moscow could create domestic instability in the PRC. Many Chinese scholars have pointed out that Beijing should ally with Moscow in a joint effort to weaken the U.S.-led international order, a system that both regimes believe presents an existential threat to their national security.

In sum, while global narratives simplify the PRC’s stance on the Russian war in Ukraine, a deeper examination reveals Beijing's neutrality. Rooted in historical experiences and contemporary geopolitical complexities, the PRC’s position is a balancing act, one that purportedly seeks peace and stability in the global arena. Beijing may not be averse to a Ukrainian victory that includes reclaiming the Donbas and even Crimea, but any further political turbulence in Russia is certainly undesirable. A Russian victory could advance Beijing’s challenge to Washington in the short run, but it could have long-term implications for Taiwan. 

Moreover, the PRC’s diplomatic maneuvers are not just about Russia and Ukraine. They are about sending a message to the international community. By advocating for peace and territorial integrity, the PRC aims to position itself as a responsible global stakeholder, which could influence its relationships with other nations. This ambition explains why the PRC’s official position supports neither Russia nor Ukraine but instead calls for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, however unlikely.

The Russian war in Ukraine serves as a reminder of the intricate dance of geopolitics. The PRC’s neutral stance in the face of a major armed conflict is a testament to this complexity. Thus, Ukraine and its western allies must recognize that the PRC's stance is one of true neutrality, rather than “pro-Russia neutrality.” The PRC maintains a genuine interest in ensuring Ukraine's territorial integrity and has shown a willingness to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv. Ukraine would be remiss to overlook this potential avenue for peace.

Kaiming Chen is a master’s degree candidate at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He specializes in conflict resolution and international law with an emphasis on non-Western approaches to peacemaking and peacebuilding. He recently completed an internship at the Global Governance Institution in Beijing, researching U.S.-China relations and broader Chinese foreign policy challenges. Kaiming has also collaborated with esteemed university professors to examine African conflicts and Chinese perspectives on peace operations. An alumnus of the College of William and Mary, he holds a bachelor's degree in international relations and psychology. 

Is China the world's best hope? is by Alisdare Hickson and is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.