Fate of Mali: The Future of a Country in Crisis
By Ritveck Rao
Political unrest is common in African nations, and Mali serves as no exception. The popular movement against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s regime gained traction upon his controversial re-election in 2018. While the movement already existed in spirit, it was only after the Constitutional Court’s recent prejudiced order of April 2020 that the it formalized. The top court irregularly re-elected 31 candidates from Keita’s political party despite the definitive results of the parliamentary elections, which indicated different results. The formation of the June 5 Movement: Rally of Patriotic Forces (5M:RFP) marked the beginning of the fall of President Keïta. The movement consisted of people of utmost prominence and popular appeal: members from the political opposition, religious leaders and notable faces from civil society. However, it was only the conjoint actions of the top military officials that actually effectuated a real shift of power through a coup d’état on August 18, 2020 These officials later called themselves the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP).
Civil society in Mali has lost trust in corrupt, power-hungry political regimes. The country suffers from presence of terrorist and jihadi Islamic outfits in the West African region, coupled with civil war, weakened faith in the judiciary, and challenges of poverty and unemployment.
Given the geo-political importance of Mali, the on-going crisis has attracted the interests of governments all over the world. The nation’s location in the Sahel region holds strategic value to western powers in their efforts to combat terrorism and insurgency, thereby making Mali’s political stability a matter of priority for them. The US currently has approximately 1,400 troops in the Sahel region, and has invested 3.2 billion USD in Mali’s socio-economic development in the past two decades. The Trump administration, however, has threatened to retract all such assistance. Mali’s leading bilateral donor, France, has similar reasons for acting as a protector of Mali. China, too, has expressed its concerns over the Malian political instability, for it may hinder their plans of expansion of the Belt Road Initiative in the Sahel region. The international community has strongly condemned the mutiny, with the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) going as far as blocking financial flow, shutting off borders, and suspending Mali’s membership.
The existing state of affairs is open to a multitude of outcomes, but the most plausible seems to be a diplomatic intervention. While all stakeholders seem to have consensus around holding free and fair parliamentary elections, the stalemate comes at the point of re-instatement of President Keïta. For domestic negotiators—the junta--he seems to be the root of all miseries in Mali. The international actors, however, cannot seem to compromise on this unlawful transition of power that grossly transgresses the principles of the Malian constitution. The issue of the duration of a transitional government should also be open to dialogue, considering its varying consequences. The change should be fast so as to restore normalcy, but not at the cost of foregoing a smooth and fair transition of power.
Military or humanitarian intervention by western forces seems highly unlikely, since the situation does not warrant the use of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The popular movement followed by the ousting of Keita, until now, has remained largely bloodless and seems to have the popular support. Moreover, the mutual acceptance of one other’s legitimacy among CNSP and 5M:RFP of a civilian rule also brings a moral backing to this transition, as both associations are focused on the betterment of Mali. Such a prospect, however, must establish security, socio-economic development, and rule of law as central principles.
At the same time, absence of legitimate international recognition is not something the new government can afford. Mali must realize that governance without military assistance will only add to the existing terrorist insurgency in Northern Mali. Economic sanctions, trade impositions, or severed diplomatic ties will only worsen the state of the Malian economy. A middle ground that will not compromise the continuation of western-led counter-insurgency actions, and thereby ensure the maintenance of a de facto power relation between Mali and its foreign allies must be struck.
Despite the transition being illegal, most western powers have their own vested interests in opposing the rule of the junta. These are premised on the fact that the new administration might not be as likely to accede to their neocolonial approaches as the previous one. However, it will only be a matter of time before such a new administration will fall prey to the economic prowess of the highly affluent western world. Major objectives of the western powers seem to overlap with the aspirations of the junta, including the intention to ensure security and stability to the region by the removal of insurgent terrorists factions.
In this whole conundrum, it becomes paramount to consider the position of the real stakeholders of this crisis: the people of Mali. The hard reality is that a significant amount of the Malian population is illiterate and politically unaware, and do not seem to care about who is in power. Their only appeal lies with their basic amenities being met. While Mali might need a government, the answer to all their problems actually lies in an improved form of governance. To get rid of basic social welfare challenges like poverty, hunger, and illiteracy, they need a dedicated, honest, corruption-free government. The direct involvement of foreign powers—especially western nations—is contentious, as the local population of Mali believes those actors to be the perpetrators of the discomforts they face.
The venture of political stability in Mali has always been a troubling and cumbersome task. The question is whether Mali, which was once designated as the beacon of democracy in Western Africa, will be able to overcome the current political turmoil against all odds. It is now safe to concede that history, despite all its learnings, often has a tendency to repeat itself. President Keïta found himself in a situation no different from his predecessor, Amadou Toumani Touré, who was ousted in 2012 in the very same camp. As the country looks to pursue stability, the coming days will be a test for Mali to draw on its lessons from the 2012 coup. Hopefully, the future will be brighter this time.
Ritveck Rao is a third-year undergraduate student at National Law University, Jodhpur, India. His research interests include Global Justice, Public International Law and Corporate Laws. He can be reached at: ritveckrao@gmail.com .
Daily Life in Djenné, Mali is by United Nations Photo and is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
