Israeli Policy and the Shadow of the Iron Wall
By Shamsher S. Bhangal
The Israeli government’s stated goals in its war with Hamas are the return of all Israeli hostages and the complete destruction of Hamas’ military potential. How far the conduct of the war has gone to achieve these objectives remains a sensitive and controversial subject among the international community. Either way, the progress of the war thus far suggests that Israel is seeking to achieve these aims, primarily if not exclusively, by military force. Israeli policymakers are applying military solutions to what may be diplomatic and political, not military, problems. One explanation for the Israeli state’s reluctance to pursue diplomatic or political channels more resolutely may be the enduring influence of the “iron wall” policy.
The iron wall was the brain-child of Ze’ev Jabotinsky (1880-1940), a Russian-born Zionist leader of immense historical importance, and appeared in the Russian journal Razsviet in November 1923. Jabotinsky offered his readers a grim interpretation of the practical issues around founding an Israeli state in the Middle East. He insisted that the local Arab population would consistently and firmly resist any attempts to establish a Jewish polity in the Levant.
Jabotinsky concludes his essay by asserting that Israeli policy can develop only “behind an iron wall, which the native [Arab] population cannot breach.” The iron wall was not, to Jabotinsky, a physical fence (although many commentators use the term “iron wall” to refer to such a physical barrier) but rather a large Jewish armed force. Why did he think a sizable and powerfully equipped Jewish army was necessary? Because the state “cannot offer any adequate compensation to the Palestinian Arabs in return for Palestine.” In other words, he thought that Arab resistance was inevitable.
We should not overlook the historical significance of this interpretation. From the very outset, Jabotinsky concluded that purely diplomatic or political measures were ineffective . The vision of meaningful and honest negotiations with the Arabs, Jabotinsky maintained, was a dangerous and optimistic illusion. Treaties, alliances, and détentes could only be enforced by the sword. Avi Shlaim suggests that this thinking has mostly characterized Israeli policy in the Levant since 1948.
The idea of the iron wall has fallen into relative obscurity in popular discourse on Israeli affairs. Oxford professor Avi Shlaim reminded western audiences of the idea in his 2000 book The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. The concept lost its staying power in mainstream discussion. However, this can be helpful for how we think about the current conflict. At the time of writing, the Israeli army is poised to launch an operation into the city of Rafah, in the southern portion of the Gaza Strip. If Israel conducts the operation and achieves success–however one might define success here–Israel will have near-total control over the Gaza Strip.
In this scenario, an iron wall will have been erected. Israeli policy will be able to withstand the pressures not just of Palestinian and other Arab remonstrations, but also those of foreign powers, particularly the United States. The Israeli government would therefore be in a position to enforce, rather than simply propose, a post-war vision for the Gaza Strip.
Of course, even if the iron wall mentality had considerable influence in Israeli decision making, it alone would not offer a comprehensive account of the official thought-process on the Palestine question. The old historiographical debate about the primacy of foreign over domestic politics rears its head here. Are events in the Gaza Strip foreign or domestic affairs for Israel? According to Henry Kissinger, to Israel, foreign and domestic policy are one and the same. Even insofar as Israeli policy in Gaza is understood to be an extension of domestic politics, the iron wall nonetheless remains a useful tool for assessing the general orientation of the Israeli political worldview.
The iron wall policy can be explained by political realism, but this does not mean the former should be discounted. Iron wall thinking has developed since 1948 in a specific historical situation. It is a specific approach to a specific problem, not a generally applicable theory. Moreover, whether readers are accurately interpreting Jabotinsky’s idea of the iron wall is equally beside the point. Iron wall thinking–true to Jabotinsky’s vision or not–has nonetheless come to characterize the Israeli approach to the Palestinian question for much of the post-1948 period.
Another contributing factor to the Israeli predisposition toward military action that policymakers should keep in mind is the surprising number of senior Israeli politicians with military backgrounds. In Europe generally, the civilian government has been largely free from military influence since 1945, but this is not the case in Israel. Israeli prime ministers David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, and Benjamin Netanyahu all have substantial military credentials – either as senior officers, or in special forces units. Their experience with the armed forces is more involved compared to regular civilian conscripts. “Former commandos dominate Israeli politics,” the Times of Israel wrote in 2012. Even in European countries with mandatory military service – like the Baltic or Scandinavian states – the distinctions between the civilian and military leaderships are clearer than they are in Israel. A militarized psychology is detectable in each one of them. How much this shared military background has contributed to a perhaps excessively belligerent approach to political questions in the Levant is up for debate.
Demographic explanations aside, iron wall thinking is not necessarily the preserve of ex-army politicians and, at any rate, does not lend itself to the promotion of diplomatic efforts. It encourages Israeli policymakers to draw the sword–rightly or wrongly–before all other options are exhausted. Whatever happens in the coming months and years, the world will surely lament if the true goals of equal rights, social justice, and tolerance were to disappear behind the iron wall.
Shamsher S. Bhangal is a History PhD student at the University of Cambridge. He completed his MPhil in Political Thought and Intellectual History at Cambridge, and his undergraduate degree in History and Politics in London.
“Window & Israeli Flag on Hebron Road” is by zeevveez and is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
