Quo Vadis, Black Sea: Regional Security in Limbo
By Volodymyr Dubovyk
The regional security of the Black Sea has entered a period of turmoil, and it very well may be a protracted one as a result of Russia’s massive aggression against Ukraine. Not only does this conflict directly involve two large Black Sea countries, but it also dramatically affects the broader security dynamics of the region. Since the final results of the aggression, and when it may halt, remain unknown, this upended state will likely be a lasting one for the region.
It was not always like this. At the dawn of the post-Cold war era, the expectations for the region were rather optimistic where discussions about collective security arrangements abounded. Functionalist ideas flourished too, calling for a focus on trade, transportation, and the environment, instead of engaging in political disagreements. The creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) seemed to fit neatly into an overall collaborative context. The issues of maritime security were talked about, and certain regional projects were introduced to deal with this such as Black Sea Harmony and BlackSeaFor. The focus has firmly centered on a plethora of the soft security concerns and issues of non-military nature.
All of this is now definitely in the past. One noticeable episode which fundamentally changed the dynamics, was Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008, which clearly showed that there is a vacuum of security in the region. Major external players were not rushing to formulate their vision of the regional security and their role in it. The EU has come up with “The Black Sea Synergy,” which has stopped quite short of active engagement. NATO has chosen not to elaborate its regional strategy. So, even with three NATO member states (and some candidates) and two EU member states here, both have yet to be truly present in any meaningful way. The United States was also primarily interested in the region through the prism of its strategic outreach to places like Iraq and Afghanistan.
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine was certainly a wake-up call. Its takeover of Crimea and aggression in Donbas has upended any hopes for peaceful and collaborative development of the region. Anxiety has settled in. Regional players have started assessing their best strategies for survival and protection of their interests in this tense environment.
The 2022 invasion was a bigger blow for the region, naturally beginning a major chapter of instability. Russia doubling down massively against Ukraine has become an Earth-shattering event. Ukraine’s resistance has added new features to the situation, showing that Russia’s hope to have a quick win and present everyone with the fait accompli has failed. Regional players, and external actors, are no longer in position to turn the blind eye to these developments. They have started to gear up for the new situation, some taking sides and others trying to balance between the warring parties.
The militarization of Crimean peninsula between 2014 and 2022 has played an essential role through providing a strategically key base for Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine in the south. However, even after Russia’s long-coveted land bridge between Donbas and Crimea was formed, its aggression to the north-west of Crimea has been met with mixed results. Moving deeply into Kherson and Mykolaiv regions, Russian troops still have not reached their objectives or been able to get close to the main prize– Odesa.
The Russian Black Sea Navy was initially seen as a major factor in this war and in the region in general. However, over the course of the conflict, its role has been limited to launching long-distance missile attacks against mainland Ukraine. Moreover, Russian control of Snake Island has appeared to be short-term, as well as their presence at some of the oil rigs in the vicinity. A major setback was certainly the loss of the flagship of the Russian navy cruiser “Moskva.” Other attacks on the Russian naval assets have taken place too, which have dramatically limited the role that the navy was supposed to play in the war.
One goal for Russia where the navy came in hand earlier in the war was a blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. This blockade was established even prior to February 24th, 2022, and was in place for many months. It was subsequently enforced by the Russian Navy earlier in the war, including cases where they shelled Ukrainian cargo ships which tried to leave the region. This major disruption of regional trade was one of the main developments for the entire Black Sea area. Moreover, it had serious implications well beyond the region, leading to a profound food crisis in numerous places around the world.
Over time, the blockade gave way to the so-called “Grain Deal”, which was struck in July 2022. Russia, having issues with enforcing the blockade, wanted to ease some sanctions on its own agricultural goods and, also, apparently wanted to appear as reasonable actor. As a result, it acquiesced to the deal. Turkey and the UN were looking for a way to mediate and solve the problem, and were eventually able to successfully insert themselves in it.
The countries of the Black Sea region have been searching for the best regional strategy during this volatile period in Ukraine. Georgia, a long-time partner of Ukraine, and a victim of the Russian aggression in 2008, has nevertheless chosen a neutral position, much to the chagrin of large swathes of its population. Azerbaijan and Armenia had a new round of hostilities, where Armenia continued to feel abandoned by Russia, and Azerbaijan became emboldened by its previous military successes.
Elsewhere in the region, Moldova faced worries about a Russian offensive earlier in the war, and is somewhat relaxed to see that the Russian offensive has stopped well-short of its borders. Romania has loyally followed its obligations as an EU and NATO member, while also supporting Ukraine; a trend which has continued since 2014. Bulgaria has found itself somewhat divided between its political class and the public, but has also mostly stayed within the parameters of the EU/NATO response.
Finally, Turkey has perfected its highly complicated and careful balancing act, which has become the trademark of its regional policies for some time now. Ankara has resolved to try and keep the channels open to both Kyiv and Moscow, focusing on mediation attempts which, in the case of success, will greatly bolster its regional international standing.
Both the United States and NATO have delayed introduction of their respective security strategies to better reflect the new realities of Russia’s massive invasion of Ukraine. There is a feeling in the air that NATO is approaching a point where it must formulate its strategic vision for its role in the region. As a result of the war, the United States has grown much more interested and engaged in the region, and time will tell whether this becomes a long-term trend.
The future of the Black Sea regional security will very much depend on the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war, and the timing of the war’s end will be a significant factor as well. Will this war end with a firm peace agreement, or a shaky armistice? The nature of how the conflict ends will also certainly impact the security prospects of the Black Sea area. The Black Sea region now stands at a crossroads, with the potential to either succumb to the chaos of conflict or to forge new paths towards cooperation and stability. The decisions made by regional players and international actors in the coming years, will determine not only the fate of Ukraine and Russia, but also the trajectory of security, prosperity, and peace for the entire region and beyond.
Volodymyr Dubovyk is Visiting Professor at Tufts University and Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Studies at Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University in Ukraine. He is one of the preeminent Ukrainian experts in the fields of international affairs, security studies, and foreign policy analysis. Dubovyk has conducted research at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1997, 2006-2007, the latter being his first Fulbright), and at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (2002). He taught at the University of Washington in 2013 as well as St. Edwards University and the University of Texas from 2016-2017 (his second Fulbright). He is co-author of Ukraine and European Security (1999) and has published numerous articles on U.S.-Ukraine relations, Black Sea regional security, international security, and Ukraine’s foreign policy and security.
Defense Ministry of Russian Federation Министерство обороны Российской Федерации, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
