Five Years On: Brexit and the Future of European Security — The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs

Jun 23

Jun 23 Five Years On: Brexit and the Future of European Security

By Rafael Loss

Five years ago, I wrote for the Fletcher Forum that Brexit would damage European security. On the fifth anniversary of the Brexit referendum, I revisit my warning, exploring how recent developments may affect the security of the continent in the coming years.

After a lengthy transition period and the finalization of trade negotiations on Christmas Eve 2020, the United Kingdom had conclusively exited the European Union with the new year. This series of events was set in motion when former UK Prime Minister David Cameron called for a referendum on the status of his country in the European community to placate challengers within his own Conservative party. Shortly after ‘Leave’ narrowly defeated ‘Remain’ on June 23, 2016, pundits launched into a barrage of impassioned takes about what Brexit would mean for this and that, for Britain, the EU, NATO, and the West. In response to a rather optimistic assessment of post-Brexit transatlantic security relations by then-dean of the Fletcher School (and former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO) James Stavridis, I too joined the choir.

Whether Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election in November 2016 only thanks to Russian interference remains hotly debated. If Brexit made NATO members any more wary of Russian actions, as Stavridis had claimed, the debate around Russia’s interference, and Trump’s own interference with Congressional and law enforcement efforts to investigate the accusations, gave little indication that it had had such positive effects. Not unlike Trump, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson attempted to suppress, and in the end succeeded, in delaying the publication until after the UK’s 2019 election of a report prepared by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament on Russian interference in British politics, including the Brexit referendum. As Germany’s federal election is on the horizon, growing fears of Russian interference are present. In the five years since Brexit, the West has been unable to devise and consistently apply an effective counter strategy to Russia’s hybrid campaign against democratic institutions.

NATO did, however, strengthen its deterrence and defense posture against Russian military aggression. At its 2016 Warsaw summit, following shortly after the Brexit referendum, NATO decided to enhance its forward presence in the eastern part of the alliance with four multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. One of these battlegroups is being led by the United Kingdom. While an important reassurance measure, this year’s Integrated Review, ambitiously titled “Global Britain in a Competitive Age”, and the accompanying Defence Command Paper raised some eyebrows among allies and analysts alike concerning Britain’s commitment to Europe’s defense. The UK government wants to retire core defense capabilities, cutting the army’s overall size, its number of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, among other measures, in favor of new digital warfare technologies. London also seeks a greater global footprint – “a tilt away from Europe as much as a tilt towards the Indo-Pacific,” as a seasoned British diplomat put it. Yet, these plans could stretch British forces and resources too thin to achieve any one task effectively, disappointing allies in both Europe and North America in the process.

Creating synergies with allies and partners could offset these cuts. The new strategy documents rarely mention the EU, however, and where they do, they praise the UK’s newfound “freedom to do things differently”. The most positive statement about the future UK-EU relationship is Britain signaling to “work with the EU where our interests coincide”. Since 2016, the EU has made some progress towards becoming a more capable global actor. Undoubtedly, it still has a long way to go. But the departure of the UK removed a major obstacle to developing new formats and instruments to improve the EU’s ability to act, including through military means. Non-EU NATO members, Canada, Norway, and the United States, will join an EU project to improve military mobility. This comes after the EU opened its Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to third-country participants. Britain, unfortunately, has shown no interest so far, suggesting that interests do not coincide from its point of view where they do apparently align among the UK’s most important international partners. To the contrary, upon the Johnson government’s request, London and Brussels omitted cooperation on foreign policy, security, and defense in the negotiations about their future relationship, even though they had planned to discuss common approaches in these areas when they first signed the withdrawal agreement in 2019.

The negotiations proceeded as Covid-19 struck Europe. The economic effects of Brexit are difficult to untangle from those of the pandemic. However, the 40 percent decline of UK exports to the EU in January 2021 was remarkable. According to the UK Office for Budget Responsibility, the disruption of UK-EU trade reduced GDP by 0.5 percent in the first quarter of 2021 and could hamper long-term productivity by as much as four percent. It remains to be seen how sustainable the UK government’s defense spending plans are in this environment. Further cuts to UK defense capabilities may be around the corner. With EU governments under increasing pressure to reduce spending amid rising sovereign debt, the case for greater cooperation among NATO allies to avoid critical capability gaps is stronger than ever.

Such cooperation should include but go beyond UK participation in PESCO projects. The E3 format, consisting of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, has proven durable despite Brexit and remains critical for coordination among Europe’s three major powers. This format could be upgraded to a European Security Council and include other important partners on a case-by-case basis. There is also an economic case for greater cooperation: duplication among European arms manufacturers has long been lamented. Consolidation could improve efficiency, particularly where big-ticket future technologies like sixth-generation fighter aircraft or battle tanks are concerned.

To capitalize on these opportunities, the EU should pursue an inclusive and integrative approach to “strategic autonomy” to allow non-EU NATO allies and other international partners to plug into EU missions and operations seamlessly, and vice versa. Third-country participation in PESCO is a promising step in that direction. But on the other side of the Channel, politics is out of sync with geographic reality. Until Boris Johnson gives up on defining his political project in opposition to the EU and starts to recognize it instead as a partner to extend the UK’s reach and pursue shared interests, NATO will be at a loss too.