The Party’s Republic of China: Political Reality on the Mainland
By Rixin Wen
The People's Republic of China (PRC) emphasizes the core concept of "people" in state politics, reflecting the ethos of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC). The CPC claims all of its actions revolve around the noble goal of serving the people wholeheartedly. This principle permeates all aspects of governance and government, perhaps best demonstrated by the addition of the word "people" to various organizations and roles. For instance, the National People's Congress (NPC) is the highest legislative body, consisting of the people's representatives, who convene annually inside the Great Hall of the People to discuss national politics and policies. Similarly, China's armed forces bear the name of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renminbi, which translates literally to "people’s note," is China’s currency, printed by the People’s Bank, the Chinese equivalent of the American Federal Reserve. Other examples include the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the People's Supreme Court, and the People's Police. These are all familiar terms to ordinary Chinese citizens.
When China celebrated its 60th anniversary in 2009, I argued that the country was a bureaucratic society that unfairly privileged public officials with undue social resources and influence. Since then, China has transformed further. During its 70th anniversary in 2019 and the centennial celebration of the CPC in 2021, China had notably shifted from a bureaucrat-centered society to the nation’s longest-existing communist regime.
Western scholars aptly describe China as a "party-state," highlighting the central role of the party in state administration and public affairs. Since its founding in 1949, the party's domination has been a fundamental feature of Chinese politics. Mao controlled China mostly through his chairmanship in the party; Deng managed Chinese politics via his post as the chair of the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC), an organ with highest authority over military and defense affairs; before Jiang became the Chinese President, he had been the party’s General Secretary for several years, while after he retired from the party secretaryship and state presidency he retained his power and authority by assuming the chair of the CMC for a couple years. In all these cases, the Chinese top leaders managed China through their party roles.
Xi Jinping’s Fortification of Party Control
Since 2012, Xi Jinping has greatly expanded the party’s reach across all public and social spheres. In "The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers," Richard McGregor emphasizes the key elements of the CPC's monopolistic rule, namely the "Three Ps": PLA, publicity, and personnel. McGregor's analysis underscores the party's grip on power, with the military, media, and key positions all falling under its sway. Xi has further expanded this control by including the police as a new "P" in the framework. Contrary to the belief that the police’s growing political prominence began with Xi, the police chief became a politburo member at the end of Jiang's presidency, and the party leader responsible for interior security joined the top rank under Hu's reign. Prior to this, the Minister of Public Security was traditionally a vice-presidential level senior official, the high status usually coming from their position of being the state councilor inside the government rather than the politburo member within the party. Xi's contribution has been twofold: placing the Chinese People's Armed Police (PAP) exclusively under the party’s command and allowing professional police officers to oversee the security apparatus (see author’s note below).
Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, his signature project, solidifies his authority by relentlessly pursuing and prosecuting “corrupt officials” perceived as political adversaries and potential threats. This campaign, unprecedented in recent history in terms of its scope and duration, is primarily orchestrated by the empowered Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the party’s top watchdog. Investigations into corrupt officials—particularly high-ranking ones—invariably commenced at the CCDI, with its use and power shifting at the party’s will. The Chinese judicial system plays an ancillary role in this process, merely overseeing convictions and concluding trials.
The anti-corruption campaign snaps at both "tigers," the high-ranking senior officials that are usually more involved in grander corruption, and "flies," the low-ranking junior officials—which are large in number and often engaged in petty corruption. This has paralyzed Xi’s political opponents and intimidated the incumbent senior leaders; Xi effectively consolidated power and enhanced his authority, enabling him to become the “core” of the party's top leadership. However, Xi wants more support to sustain his leadership. The 2018 constitutional amendment abolishing the presidential term limit, seen by many scholars as realizing Xi's dream for lifelong tenure, forced state law to align with party rule. Unlike the Chinese Constitution, the CPC's own version sets no time limitation for holding office, practically permitting the party’s general secretary, the de facto Chinese supreme leader, to remain at the helm of the CPC indefinitely. However, due to the limited opportunities for the party general secretaries to travel internationally in their own capacity, all three CPC heads since Jiang have concurrently held the position of state president. This consolidation of roles bolsters the general secretary's authority and influence, as the state presidency provides an international platform for the party leader, which reinforces their domestic standing. Nevertheless, the state presidency is constitutionally limited to two terms. Removal of this cap settles the “constitutional incongruity” between party and state.
The Party’s Public Policy Preferences
The Chinese youth, mostly born between the 1980s and the first decade of the 21st century, are the only child for their parents who needed to comply with the notorious government requirement that most Chinese could only have one child. This family planning policy aimed to curb explosive population growth through harsh birth control measures. The priority and urgency of this policy on the national agenda resulted in the establishment of the State Family Planning Commission, a ministerial-level department. Failure in birth control negated the evaluation of local government work and jeopardized local leaders’ career prospects and dimmed their chances of getting promoted, resulting in the wide use of forced abortion and sterilization to meet the set targets on newborn limitation. However, demographic shifts have fueled economic concerns, creating a growing sense of anxiety that China will be left with a dwindling working-age population that is unable to sustain its economic growth. The increased recognition of China’s aging society caused significant policy revisions in 2013, 2015, and 2021 under the party’s instruction. Unfortunately, yet unsurprisingly, decades-long propaganda and strict implementation resulted in low fertility rates and growing reluctance among couples to have more than one child due to the high cost of raising children.
In 2013, Chinese universities were banned from discussing seven taboo subjects, including constitutionalism, civil society, and the party's historical errors. The party sought to shield the Chinese youth from what it deemed to be harmful Western ideas and beliefs. Professors that dared to question or defy this guideline risked their careers. Meanwhile, Xi's ideology became a core component of mandatory university courses. Starting in the fall of 2021, all Chinese students began using new textbooks that praise and promote Xi's thoughts, in order to foster their allegiance to the party from early childhood. From primary school on, Chinese students are required to learn to love and follow the party's leadership; students are groomed throughout their education to become firm supporters and trustworthy defenders of Chinese socialism.
The CPC eventually ended the contentious debate between the market economy and central planning during its 14th National Congress in 1992, opting to embrace markets as an indispensable component of the Chinese socialist economy. Over the subsequent two decades, the private economy enjoyed a honeymoon period with the ruling party, with the CPC opening its doors to entrepreneurs, who contributed to the party's enrichment. Utilizing favorable government policies, private enterprises flourished nationwide; this created numerous job opportunities, absorbed a significant proportion of the labor force, and accelerated urbanization. Entrepreneurship also catalyzed technological innovation in China, which began impressing the outside world, with renowned technology giants like Lenovo, Alibaba, and Huawei carving names for themselves in the global market. This new environment, which promised competitive salaries and an exciting global atmosphere, drew talented minds and caused college graduates to rush to the private sector; this became the driving force of the Chinese economy.
While the CPC maintained some degree of presence within private companies, leaders prior to Xi allowed for considerable managerial autonomy. However, Xi has emphasized that the party’s control within the private sector is vital to its overarching leadership, and has pushed hard to increase the CPC’s involvement in corporate management and personnel appointments. Concerns that some companies, with their technological advantages and might could grow ambitious and challenge public authorities have motivated Chinese regulators to intensify efforts to ensure party secretaries and units play an active and decisive role in the private economy. Moreover, government antitrust probes are ready to tame any defiant company.
Today's PRC: A Party-Dominated Reality
A decade after Xi’s rise to power, the Chinese political system has shifted enormously, with party oversight now permeating across all public and private domains. The party now dictates various aspects of people's lives and the Chinese public has little room to criticize, question, or disagree with their rulers on vital matters. The separation of powers between party and state, briefly practiced during Deng's time in power, has been totally forgotten or disregarded. State bodies now work primarily as enforcers of party policy. The annual sessions of the NPC and CPPCC were once highly-anticipated journalistic events because they provided invaluable opportunities for the reporters to face-to-face interview and talk with ministers, directors and provincial leaders who seldom host or hold press conferences, learn their personal thoughts on the major issues, and explore the internal debates around the policies and policy changes. Most significantly, the news conference attended by the Chinese premier after the conclusion of the NPC annual session is the only occasion where the head of the Chinese government openly meets the press and mass media, and answers questions. They seem to have lost their appeal. In the past, these meetings received substantial media attention, as reporters covered different voices and opinions. Nowadays, the two meetings are less informative because the party does not need to maintain the pretense of an open space for lively policy discourse and discussion in China.
The Party’s Republic of China, a PRC distinct from the envisioned People's Republic of China, epitomizes the current political reality on the mainland. The party’s preeminence is creating an oversized, overbearing, and overweening bureaucratic structure, fraught with overstaffed offices, overlapping functions, contradictory directives and conflicting objectives. This leads to delays, inefficiency, departmentalism, and enduring interagency tensions. Despite various attempts to justify its one-party rule, all CPC endeavors aim to serve the party's interest and have little to do with its populace. When the country is governed for the benefit of the party rather than the benefit of the people, it risks fueling public dissatisfaction and disillusionment, because governance and policies purposefully and specifically become biased in favor of the ruling communist party and its minority elites.
Author’s Note: Chinese politics has a tradition of not having real police in the politburo or cabinet. Currently, two professional police officers have been promoted to be a politburo member and state councilor respectively, taking charge of the party’s political and legal affairs committee, a law enforcement organ, and government’s public security ministry.
Rixin Wen has long been working for a local Chinese government, witnessing with his own eyes the rapid changes and transformations Chinese people and society are undergoing, while also observing all kinds of resulting problems and conflicts. As a result, he started paying attention to the issue of good government and governance in China. Wen went to USC for his MPA studies, acquiring knowledge on public administration and social management. He is now a doctoral student at Claremont Graduate University, writing his dissertation on how Xi Jinping's anti-corruption endeavors are reshaping the Chinese state and its politics.
Xi Jinping is by Global Panorama and is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.
